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Casenote
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS IN NEBRASKA.
State v. Fronning, 186 Neb. 463, 183 N.W.2d 920 (1971).
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been an established rule of courtroom procedure that
a party calling a witness is prohibited from testing the credibility
of that witness except under certain conditions, and then only in
certain ways. The basic premise that one may not impeach one's
own witness has, to a greater or lesser extent, been modified by
courts and legislatures over the years,' but for the most part the
decision-making process has remained impervious to the impressive
array of judicial theorists who have roundly criticised the rule for
not meeting the exigencies of modern practice.
2
In State v. Fronning3 the Supreme Court of Nebraska overturned
almost eighty years of precedent and abrogated virtually every
restriction on the impeachment of one's own witness in Nebraska
courts. The characteristically brief opinion written by Justice Smith
employed no circumspection: "We abandon the rule; credibility of
a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
him."4
But the holding was not the product of unanimity. Three Judges
who concurred only in the result felt that the broad change was pre-
mature and that careful research was necessary in order to properly
limit the operation of the traditional rule.5 At the very least, they
thought the court should await the recommendations of the com-
mittee appointed to draft a Code of Evidence for the state.6
' Six jurisdictions have effectively abolished the common law rule by
statute. CAL. EviD. CODE § 785 (West 1966); C.Z. CODE tit. 5, § 2825
(1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-420 (Vernon 1965); Ky. REv. STAT., R.
Civ. P. 43.07 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16, Rule 20 (Supp.
1960); V.I. CODE tit. 5, § 834 (1957).
2 See, e.g., 3A J. WiGmOIE, EVIDENCE §§ 896-907 (rev. ed. 1970); C. Mc-
ComvMcK, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954). For succinct reviews of some of the
treatises criticizing the common law rule see United States v. Free-
man, 302 F.2d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Baltimore & 0. Ry.,
208 F.2d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1954).
3 186 Neb. 463, 183 N.W.2d 920 (1971).
4 Id. at 465, 183 N.W.2d at 921. The only reason actually given for the
holding was that parties no longer have free choice in selecting wit-
nesses.
5 Id. at 466, 183 N.W.2d at 922.
6 Id.
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The circumstances precipitating this controversy were hardly
unique. Leland Fronning and seven of his teen-age friends were
attending a party in Hastings when Fronning became involved in
an argument with Richard Smith, whom Fronning did not know.
Allegedly after a push by Smith, Fronning struck him on the jaw
and Smith fell to the floor. Thinking he was not unconscious,
Fronning fell on Smith and struck him three times in the side.
Fronning then arose and kicked Smith twice in the face.
Fronning was tried and convicted of assault with intent to inflict
great bodily injury.7 At trial the State called Fronning's friends
as witnesses, and during direct examination the county attorney
made reference to previous contradictory statements allegedly made
by each witness concerning the push by Smith and his unconscious-
ness prior to Fronning's second attack. The county attorney stated
that one of Fronning's friends was changing his story.
On appeal Fronning contended that the references to prior con-
tradictory statements materially strengthened the substantive evi-
dence of the State and that they constituted an invalid attempt by
the county attorney to impeach his own witnesses. The court re-
jected both contentions and affirmed the conviction.8
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
At earliest common law, a party's "witnesses" were his friends
and relatives, summoned to court in specified numbers to take a
prescribed oath by means of which the issue was decided.9 They
were mere "oath-helpers," not testifiers as to facts, and the party
had complete freedom of choice in their selection.'0 The logical
implication of this was that one could not dispute his own witness.
As Wigmore says: "So long as such a notion persisted, it was incon-
ceivable that a party should gainsay his own witness; he had been
told to bring a certain number of persons to swear for him; if one
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-413 (Reissue 1964). Fronning pleaded self-de-
fense, alleging that Smith had appeared to be under the influence of
alcohol or drugs and that Fronning thought he was armed.
8 The court also rejected a second assignment of error concerning in-
structions relating to beer, marijuana and LSD, 186 Neb. at 465-66,
183 N.W.2d at 920.
9 3 J. WiGmoRE, EVIENCE § 896 (3d ed. 1940); F. 1irLA-D, THE Forms
oF ACTION AT CommoN LAw 12-13 (1968). The "witnesses" were re-
quired merely to swear that the oath of the party who called them
was clean and unperjured. If they did so, there was an end to the
case.
10 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896, at 383 (3d ed. 1940).
354 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
or more did not do so, that was merely his loss; he should have
chosen better ones for his purpose."'1
But the emergence of the modern concept of the jury brought
with it a change in the character of witnesses. No longer permitted
merely to swear an oath on behalf of a friend, witnesses were
obliged to have some knowledge of the facts bearing on the issue
at bar, and the parties were correspondingly limited in their selec-
tion. This limitation and the complexity of new courtroom pro-
cedures were doubtless factors which led to a controversy concern-
ing the impeachment of one's own witness in the English Courts.12
In any case, the dispute was settled by a statute which allowed the
use of prior inconsistent statements, subject to the trial court's
discretion, to impeach a witness who proved to be adverse. 13
The controversy made its first recorded appearance in a Nebraska
court in Blackwell v. Wright.14 Citing no authority for the principle
of law involved, nor for the simultaneously created exception, the
court held that the calling of a witness was an implied recom-
mendation that the witness was worthy of belief which could not
be contradicted. This, said the court, prohibited a party from im-
peaching the character of his own witness.15 But while establishing
this rule, the Blackwell holding offered an alternative to impeach-
ment: a showing that the facts were not as stated by the party's
own witness by means of additional evidence to the contrary.16 This
distinction between impeachment and contradiction was to provide
the framework within which much of the subsequent case law
would be confined.
But the clarity of the Blackwell holding was short-lived. In
Nathan v. Sands17 the court, presented with a trial situation similar
to Blackwell, held that a party could not present any evidence the
only effect of which was to demonstrate that his own witness was
not worthy of belief. What made the holding confusing was the
11 Id.
12 The controversy is discussed in 4 B. JoNEs, EVIDENCE § 941 (5th ed.
1958).
'3 Id.
14 27 Neb. 269, 43 N.W. 116 (1889).
15 Id. at 273, 43 N.W. at 117.
16 Id.: "The rule will not prevent a person from proving the fact to be
different from that which is stated by his own witness. The witness
may be mistaken, may be misinformed, or he may have misled the
party calling him. In either event, the party so calling him would
not be prevented from showing the exact facts as they occurred, and
this is not considered an impeachment of his witness."
17 52 Neb. 660, 72 N.W. 1030 (1897).
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fact that Nathan seemed to be prohibiting simple contradiction of
a witness by subsequent evidence. While the details of the conflict-
ing evidence are not provided, the opinion seems to indicate that
the evidence was offered in an attempt to prove that a certain
transaction which the defendant, as plaintiff's witness, denied mak-
ing was, in fact, made. This was held to be impeachment of the
witness' s even though Blackwell was presented as the controlling
citation.' 9 Faced with waters thus muddied, attorneys of the period
must have been thoroughly confused.
In any case, a new practice developed and, with it, a new
avenue of analysis for the court. Although a party could not call
additional witnesses to contradict the testimony of his previous
witness without fear of having to resolve the Blackwell-Niathan
dilemma on appeal, there seemed to be little danger in showing the
witness was contradicting himself. The prior inconsistent statement,
central to the development of this branch of the impeachment rules,
was first considered in H. F. Cady Lumber Co. v. Wilson Steam
Boiler Co.2O where the court, relying entirely on foreign state prece-
dent,21 held that it was within the discretion of the trial court to
permit a party to ask his own witness whether or not he had made
a statement prior to trial in contradiction to his present testimony.
This, said the court, would permit "eliciting the truth from a con-
fused or unwilling witness.
'22
But the spectre of Nathan still plagued the court, and by 1922
it had limited the use of prior inconsistent statements so as not to
allow anything that might be considered "impeachment" of the
witness. While the statement could be used to refresh the witness's
memory, it could not be introduced into evidence in its entirety,23
nor could it be read from too extensively.24 Furthermore, no addi-
18 The situation is briefly discussed, and no comments concerning the
distinguishing character of the evidence are offered. It would seem,
however, that the evidence was merely offered for the purpose of con-
tradicting a material fact and, in view of the court's previous holding,
should have been admitted.
'19 Nathan v. Sands, 52 Neb. 660, 664, 72 N.W. 1030, 1032 (1897).
20 80 Neb. 607, 114 N.W. 774 (1908).
21 People v. Payne, 131 1Mich. 474, 91 N.W. 739 (1902); Dallas Street Ry.
v. McAllister, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 131, 90 S.W. 933 (1905); Smith v.
State, 46 Tex. Crim. 267, 81 S.W. 936 (1904); State v. Cummins, 76
Iowa 133, 40 N.W. 124 (1888).
22 H. F. Cady Lumber Co. v. Wilson Steam Boiler Co., 80 Neb. 607, 610,
114 N.W. 774, 775 (1908).
23 Masourides v. State, 86 Neb. 105, 125 N.W. 132 (1910).
24 Erdman v. State, 90 Neb. 642, 134 N.W. 258 (1912).
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tional witnesses could be called to testify as to the prior statement,
the party being limited to probing his own witness's recollection.25
Then in 1922 the court again sought to liberalize the rule. After
a review of the authorities criticizing the common law doctrine of
immunity for one's own witness, the majority opinion in Penhansky
v. Drake Realty Construction Co.20 adopted what was apparently
considered a broadly reformed rule:
Where one has been misled or entrapped into calling a witness by
reason of such witness, previous to the trial, having made state-
ments to the party, or his counsel, favorable to the party's conten-
tion, and at variance with the testimony at the trial, and the party
believed and relied upon such statements in calling the witness,
and is surprised by the testimony on a material point, he may, in
the discretion of the court, be permitted to show the contradictory
statement made before trial
2 7
In addition, the court specifically overruled Blackwell, as well as
those cases which had qualified the previous reform instituted by
Cady.
28
The force of this reform was dulled somewhat by the reappear-
'ance of Nathan, like Banquo's ghost, less than a year later. In Krull
v. Arman29 the court held that Nathan was still the true rule, and
evidence could not be presented which could only tend to impeach
one's own witness. But the court drew a distinction between im-
peachment and contradiction, and instead of citing Blackwell, which
had been banned from the judicial process by the Penhansky hold-
ing, it cited a New York case.30
With Nathan back at the banquet, the process of narrowing and
qualifying the rule began again. The court held that a prior incon-
sistent statement could not be admitted if it did not comply with
ordinary rules of evidence.3 ' Furthermore, the party had to be
truly surprised by the testimony of his witness before Penhansky
could be invoked.32 And the statement could be used only to re-
fresh the memory of the witness and induce him to change his
story, never for impeachment. 33
25 Merkouras v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 101 Neb. 717, 164 N.W. 719 (1917).
26 109 Neb. 120, 190 N.W. 265 (1922).
27 Id. at 122, 190 N.W. at 266.
28 Id. at 123-24, 190 N.W. at 267.
29 110 Neb. 70, 192 N.W. 961 (1923).
30 De Noyelles v. Delaware Ins. Co., 78 Misc. 649, 138 N.Y.S. 855 (Sup.
Ct. 1912).
-1 Lewis v. Miller, 119 Neb. 765, 230 N.W. 769 (1930).
32 Blochowitz v. Blochwitz, 122 Neb. 385, 240 N.W. 586 (1932).
33 Krull v. Arman, 110 Neb. 70, 192 N.W. 961 (1923); Stanley v. Sun Ins.
Office, 126 Neb. 205, 252 N.W. 807 (1934).
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In 1941 the court was again ready to broaden the rule. In
Cornell v. State4 the court provided its first comprehensive analysis
of the practical problems a restrictive rule presented, particularly in
the prosecution of criminal cases. The court observed:
The witnesses who must be called in a criminal case as eye wit-
nesses of the alleged offense cannot be selected beforehand by th
prosecutor, but are determined simply by the circumstances of who
happened to be present at that time and place. It is the duty of the
prosecutor to take such preliminary statements, examine into all
the facts, weigh the character and standing of the witnesses, and
if one of the witnesses, when the case comes to trial, unexpectedly
changes his story, he is privileged to show the jury the facts which
led him to call such witnesses to the stand.3 5
Citing a 1928 holding that a prior inconsistent statement did not
constitute substantive evidence,386 the court held that it was permis-
sible to admit the entire transcript of such a statement which had
been taken by the county attorney from a witness who later con-
tradicted it at trial. "Its only purpose," said the court "is to explain
to the jury the reason why a hostile witness was called to the stand
by the state: '87
But while the holding of Cornell liberalized the rule concerning
prior inconsistent statements, it also reflected the constraint of
Nathan. The "only purpose" language seems to be a tacit reference
to the Nathan doctrine that evidence could not be admitted the
"only purpose" of which was impeachment of one's own witness.
The problem of foundation was also considered in Cornell, and the
court held that questions and answers which indicated that the
witness was changing his story provided a sufficient foundation of
surprise to invoke Penhansky.38
In Moore v. State3 9 the court flirted with the Nathan rule, hold-
ing that it was always permissible to ask a witness if he had made
a prior inconsistent statement, even though "the incidental effect of
it is to impeach the witness. '40 This was the first time the court
had conceded the possibility that impeachment might be a by-
product of the use of a prior inconsistent statement. Generally, the
use of such statements had been justified on the grounds that they
34 139 Neb. 878, 299 N.W. 231 (1941).
35 Id. at 882, 299 N.W. at 233.
86 Sindelar v. T.B. Hord Grain Co., 116 Neb. 776, 219 N.W. 145 (1928).
37 Cornell v. State, 139 Neb. 878, 883, 299 N.W. 231, 233 (1941).
s8 Id. at 882, 299 N.W. at 232.
39 147 Neb. 390, 23 N.W.2d 552 (1946).
40 Id. at 394, 23 N.W.2d at 554.
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would refresh the witness's memory, and impeachment, having been
made a dangerous word by Nathan, was never considered. The
court in Moore also restated the Cornell holding with regard to
foundation.
In 1949 a general overview of the progress made toward reform
of the impeachment rule was presented by the court in Guyette v.
Schmer.41 Nathan was again dusted off and presented as the true
rule, with Penhansky being characterized as an exception. And,
once more, the distinction between impeachment and contradiction
was stressed, Blackwell, of course, not being cited.
42
The cases which followed Guyette, with one exception, did little
more than re-state the rule of Moore43 and re-hash the difference
between impeachment and contradiction. 44 The one exception was
Wilson v. State45 in which the court gave the first indication that
it was becoming dissatisfied with the Penhansky rule concerning the
use of prior inconsistent statements. In Wilson the trial court had
permitted the county attorney to impeach his own witness by using
such statements, even though the state had not been surprised by
the witness's testimony. The court held that this was error under
the Penhansky rule, but that the error was harmless. 46 Since the
statement did not constitute substantive evidence, the court rea-
soned, it did not controvert or destroy the testimony given at trial
and thus could not have prejudiced the defendant.47
The holding in Wilson was far more significant than its language
made it appear. By holding that such impeachment was not prejudi-
cial error in the absence of surprise, the court dealt a crucial blow
to the Penhansky rationale. Since the requirement of surprise had
been the primary restriction on the use of prior inconsistent state-
ments, Wilson must have led a good many attorneys and lower court
41 150 Neb. 659, 35 N.W.2d 689 (1949).
42 Id. at 665, 35 N.W.2d at 693 (quoting Thorp v. Leibrecht, 56 N.J. Eq.
499, 39 A. 361 (1897)): "While the plaintiff, who calls defendants as
his witnesses, cannot impeach their character for veracity generally,
he may show that the whole or any part of what they have sworn to
is untrue, either by their own examination and the improbability
of their own story, or by other contradictory evidence material to
the issue."
43 Svehla v. State, 168 Neb. 553, 96 N.W.2d 649 (1959); Welton v. State,
171 Neb. 643, 107 N.W.2d 394 (1961).
44 State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Jensen, 171 Neb. 1, 105
N.W.2d 459 (1960).
45 170 Neb. 494, 103 N.W.2d 258 (1960).
46 Id. at 517, 103 N.W.2d at 273.
47 Id.
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judges to conclude that the court was implicitly overruling Pen-
hansky and tacitly permitting prior inconsistent statements to be
used for impeachment purposes under substantially more diverse
circumstances, providing they met the ordinary requirements of
admissibility. That there was justification for this view is manifest.
During the period following Guyette the legislature revised the
statutes concerning the use of depositions but did little to contribute
to reform. A party was permitted to impeach an adverse deponent
by using a prior statement, even though a foundation for such
impeachment had not been laid at the time the statement was
taken.48 Furthermore, at least in felony trials, a deposition could
be used "by any party solely for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness."49 Nothing
was said about any foundational requirements in. the latter case,
presumably leaving the party subject to the restrictions of the case
law and thus doing little more than re-stating the previously estab-
lished rules concerning prior inconsistent statements in general. In
fact, the legislative provisions were narrower than the existing case
law by virtue of their operative restriction to depositions, rather
than statements in general.
Outside this jurisdiction, however, the traditional rule was be-
ginning to crumble. The American Law Institute had already pro-
vided in its Model Code that either party could impeach a witness,
and it had noted that the common law rule had little but history
to support it.5 ° The Uniform Rules of Evidence were published in
1953, and they contained a provision that either party could ex-
amine a witness and introduce extrinsic evidence bearing on his
credibility.5' The rules of evidence that were being proposed for
the Federal District Courts provided the language that was ulti-
mately to be used in Fronning: "[T]he credibility of a witness may
48 NEE. REV. STAT. § 25-1267.07 (Reissue 1964).
49 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917 (Supp. 1969). The same is true of civil
actions. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1267.04(1) (Reissue 1964).
50 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1) (1942): "[F]or the purpose
of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party in-
cluding the party calling him may examine him and introduce extrin-
sic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other matter
relevant upon the issue of his credibility as a witness . . . . " The
comment that the rule has little but history to support it is found
in comment b.
51 UNIFomVt RULEs OF EVIDENCE rule 20 (1953): "[Flor the purpose of
impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party includ-
ing the party calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic
evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other matter relevant
upon the issues of credibility."
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be attacked by any party, including the party calling him."52 And
the legislatures of six jurisdictions had either completely abrogated
the rule by statute or substantially liberalized it.
53
Foreign state case law, while indicating a trend toward reform,
remained mixed.54 But progress was being made in the Federal
courts. In the Third Circuit the court held that a party is not bound
by everything his witness says, particularly in cases where he is
compelled to call the witness.55 In the Second Circuit the court
denounced the common law rule against impeachment in no uncer-
tain terms. In United States v. Freeman56 it noted that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (b), which provides for impeachment
by the calling party in the case of an "adverse" witness, had no
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But, said
the court, there was even more reason to allow a defendant to im-
peach his own witness in a criminal trial "where every proper
means of ascertaining the truth should be placed at the defendant's
disposal."57 Moreover, the court held that, in such a case, it would
be "pointless to require a showing . . . that such witnesses are
hostile."s
The situation that faced the Fronning court, then, was com-
pelling. Under the theory that one holds out his witnesses as
worthy of belief, Nathan had been prohibiting or severely restrict-
ing impeachment of one's own witness for nearly three-quarters of
a century. The analytical circumspection which it had generated
had done little to alleviate the practical problems facing a party
52 PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICTS AND
MAGISTRATES rule 607 (Rev. Draft 1971), which adopted verbatim the
rule articulated in the preliminary draft, published in 1969.
53 See CAL. EvD. CODE § 785 (West 1966); C.Z. CODE tit. 5, § 2824 (1963).
K-am. STAT. ANN. § 60-420 (Vernon 1965); Ky. REv. STAT., R. Crv. P.
43.07 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16, Rule 20 (Supp. 1960);
V.I. CODE tit. 5, § 834 (1957).
54 The status of the case law in various jurisdictions concerning par-
ticular issues in this area may be found in 3A J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE
§ 900 n.1 (evidence of bad moral character), § 905 n.6 (use of prior
inconsistent statements), § 907 n.7 (contradiction by other witnesses)
(rev. ed. 1970).
55 Johnson v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953). Because
the plaintiff was advised by the trial judge that he had so far failed to
make out his case, he called the only eye witness to the alleged wrong-
full death of his deceased-the railroad detective who had shot him.
The court said that to hold the plaintiff bound by everything the
witness said would be absurd.
56 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962).
57 Id. at 351.
58 Id.
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who had been damaged by his own witness, particularly if the
witness had made no statement prior to trial. In addition, the court
was faced with the condemnation of the restrictive rule by judicial
theorists, the statutes in other jurisdictions which abrogated the
rule and the trend in the Federal courts to abolish the rule.
On the other hand, the court must have recognized the problems
inherent in giving the calling party the power to attack his own
witness.59 The abuses which complete abrogation of the common
law rule might precipitate doubtless weighed heavily with the
judges. But while the minority thought it best to give the matter
more thought, the majority decided to discard totally the prohibi-
tion on impeachment of one's own witness, while leaving a sub-
stantial amount of room for judicial qualification, on a case by case
basis, as the abuses of the rule become apparent.
III. THE PRESENT ANkD FUTURE IMPACT OF FRONNING
By virtue of the court's approach to this problem, the decision
in Fronning raises as many questions as it does answers. While it
will clearly have a substantial effect on courtroom procedure, the
nature and scope of that effect are necessarily dependent on subse-
quent case law for delineation. Fronning is merely a starting point
for what will likely be a long line of particularizing decisions, and
the court is largely free to pursue whatever course it wishes in
terms of permissive or restrictive rules.
But we are not without clues as to the court's present intention.
The authorities cited in support of the new rule,6 0 the circum-
stances surrounding it, the case law it appears to supplant, and
the case law it leaves untouched all provide significant guidelines
for the practitioner who wishes to avail himself of the new freedom.
To begin with, the spirit of the holding is to place the party
calling a witness on generally equal footing with his adversary in
terms of impeachment of that witness. The calling party is no
59 The principles generally used to justify the common law rule include
the notion that it is unwise to give the calling party the power to
coerce his own witness since that tends to place the witness at the
mercy of the party who called him. This principle, and others, are
discussed in 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896 et. seq. (rev. ed. 1970).
60 United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962); C. McComwIcK,
EVimENC. § 38 (1954); MODEL CODE OF EVDEN E rule 106 (1942); PRO-
POSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND
MAcisTRATEs rule 6-07 (Prelim. Draft 1969); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 904 (rev. ed. 1970); UNFoRm RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 20 (1953).
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longer held to recommend his witnesses as worthy of belief, and he
is as free as his opponent to attack their credibility. This general
parity should have its most significant impact in three major areas:
available impeachment tactics, use of prior inconsistent statements
and the discretion of the trial court.
A. AVAILABLE IMPEACHMENT TACTICS
A party whose witness has damaged him on a material point is
no longer confined to contradicting the witness by means of subse-
quent evidence or to the use of a prior inconsistent statement.
Having been granted the same right to attack the credibility of the
witness as his opponent, it is logical to assume that he will be
permitted to employ much the same means to effectuate that right.
Thus a party should be able to show that his own witness has an
interest or bias in the case at bar or that he is corrupt,61 but the
proof will be limited to material matters and should not be admis-
sible on collateral isues such as the extent of the interest.
6 2
The use of character evidence, because of its susceptibility to
abuse, will likely be circumscribed. The Model Code of Evidence
provides that character evidence may be used by any party so long
as it bears directly on the issue of credibility.63 The Proposed
Federal Court Rules are more specific, limiting the attack to the
witness's general character for truthfulness and prohibiting extrin-
sic evidence concerning specific instances of conduct.6 4 The Ne-
braska rules concerning impeachment of an opponent's witness are
in accord with this general formulation and will likely be applied
to the calling party as well. Thus he should be permitted to call
a subsequent witness to testify as to the preceeding witness's gen-
eral reputation for untruthfulness 65 but will not be allowed to intro-
61 3A J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 901 (rev. ed. 1970). This is not only proper
on policy reasons alone but follows logically from the fact that the
calling party is now on an equal plane with his adversary in terms
of impeachment of any witness, and the adversary is afforded these
rights.
62 Thus in Eden v. Klaas, 166 Neb. 354, 89 N.W.2d 74 (1958), the de-
fendant was permitted to show that the witness called by his ad-
versary had filed suit in connection with the same accident but was
properly precluded from going into the amount sought as damages in
that suit. See also Vassar v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 121 Neb. 140, 236
N.W. 189 (1931); Sedlacek v. State, 147 Neb. 834, 25 N.W.2d 533 (1946).
63 MODEL CODE or EVIDENCE rule 106(1) (1942), cited in note 50 supra,
and Comment c (5).
64 PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES rule 608 (Rev. Draft 1971).
65 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 147 Neb. 33, 23 N.W.2d 316 (1946).
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duce extrinsic evidence of specific acts. 66 The calling party should
also be permitted to inquire of his witness whether or not he has
been convicted of a felony but should not be permitted to introduce
extrinsic evidence of the conviction, with the exception of the
record. This is the rule which applies to his opponent.
67
Evidence concerning the witness's capacity for perception and
recollection should also be allowed even though it is adduced by
the party calling the witness. Matters such as insanity, 8 inadequacy
of opportunity to observe, 69 impaired capacity by drink7 or by
drug addiction 7 1 or habitual defects in perception 72 should now be
open to inquiry by the calling party since all are open to his ad-
versary.
B. THE PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
Besides widening the scope of tactics available to a party whose
witness has damaged him on a material point, Fronning has made
permissible what Wilson called harmless error: the use of a prior
inconsistent statement in the absence of surprise. Thus a party
may call a witness knowing that his testimony will, in part, be
adverse. In this way the party may get the helpful testimony before
the court and use the prior statements to discredit that portion
which is harmful.
The requirements of foundation have not been substantially
altered except with regard to surprise (which was probably al-
ready altered by Wilson). Where previously the party was required
to lay a foundation of surprise for the use of such a statement 3 and
for its proof by extrinsic evidence,74 the party should now be com-
pelled to lay a general foundation only in the latter case. That is,
before the party may prove a prior statement by extrinsic evidence
he must ask his witness whether or not he made the statement.
This is the approach of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
Federal courts75 and is also the rule which applies to the party's
66 Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 122 N.W. 72 (1909); Myers v. State, 51
Neb. 517, 71 N.W. 33 (1897).
67 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1214 and 29-2011 (Reissue 1964).
68 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 900 (rev. ed. 1970).
69 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 and Comment c(2) (1942).
70 Id., Comment c(1); Willis v. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N.W. 254 (1894).
71 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. McKenna, 74 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1934).
72 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 and Comment c(2) (1942).
73 Moore v. State, 147 Neb. 390, 23 N.W.2d 552 (1946).
74 Cornell v. State, 139 Neb. 878, 299 N.W. 231 (1941).
75 PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAG-
ISTRATES rule 613 (b) (Rev. Draft 1971).
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opponent in Nebraska."8 The foundational requirement should not
apply when the witness is a party, since the prior statement is
admissible as an admission anyway, and extrinsic evidence should
be permitted without the foundational questions unless, for example,
it would be cumulative.77 Although the Fronning court cited two
authorities which indicate that the foundation rule is inflexible,' 8
the Model Code of Evidence places it within the discretion of the
trial court.
79
It must also be remembered that extrinsic evidence cannot be
admitted to prove a prior inconsistent statement which concerns a
collateral matter80 and that the prior inconsistent statement must
meet ordinary requirements of admissibility to be used.81 By virtue
of the grant of additional impeachment tactics discussed above, how-
ever, the range of admissible content of a prior statement has been
widened. Thus it may be used when it concerns bias, interest, cor-
ruption, and similar matters.
C. THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL COURT
Fronning permits a party to impeach his own witness as a matter
of right without any prior invocation of the trial court's discretion.
This does not, however, remove the court from the impeachment
process altogether. Because the parties are now equally able to
impeach a given witness they are also equally governed by the
existing rules regulating impeachment. By granting the calling
party the same right as his opponent Fronning impliedly subjects
him to the same restrictions. Thus the court will retain its power
to pass on the admissibility of evidence.
In addition, the trial court may be granted substantial latitude
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence. This is the approach of
the Model Code which views the application of the new rule as a
balancing process. In each case, says the Code, "the value of the
evidence . . . must be weighed against the risks that its admission
will unfairly surprise the opponent, will cause undue consumption
of time, will confuse the issues, or will work an illegitimate preju-
76 Pierce v. State, 173 Neb. 319, 113 N.W.2d 333 (1962).
77 Falkinburg v. Inter-State Business Men's Accident Co., 132 Neb. 670,
272 N.W. 924 (1937); McDaniel v. Farlow, 132 Neb. 273, 271 N.W.
905 (1937).
78 C. MCCORMCK, EVIDENCE § 37 (1954); 3A J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 906
(rev. ed. 1970).
79 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(2) (1942).
80 Griffith v. State, 157 Neb. 448, 59 N.W.2d 701 (1953); Whiteside v.
Adams Express Co., 89 Neb. 430, 131 N.W. 953 (1911).
81 Lewis v. Miller, 119 Neb. 765, 230 N.W. 769 (1930); Wilson v State,
170 Neb. 494, 103 N.W.2d 258 (1960).
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dice out of proportion to its legitimate influence."8 2 Such a notion
would permit the trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible evi-
dence in situations where the new rule might present a danger
either to the opposing party or to the economy of court time. In
fact, the court might be persuaded to extend this grant of discre-
tionary power beyond those cases which involve the Fronning
rule.
88
Although there will doubtless be a substantial narrowing of the
broad Fronning language along the lines discussed above, it would
seem that Nathan has finally been exorcised from the body of case
law in this area. It is unlikely, in view of the firm stance taken
by the court, that the Fronning rule will soon be abandoned and a
resurrection of Nathan effected, but the circumstances surrounding
the holding leave a good deal of room for judicial retreat.
To begin with, Fronning was not the most desirable vehicle for
such sweeping change. Neither party had been faced with a tactical
problem generated by the old rule, and neither party questioned the
wisdom of the impeachment prohibition in Nathan. In general, the
questions presented by opposing counsel concerned the use of pre-
trial statements, the primary issue being whether or not the county
attorney who used them should have been compelled to introduce
them into evidence in their entirety.8 4 In short, the pressures for re-
form came from sources wholly extrinsic to the argument and
factual situation presented in Fronning. This being true, it would
82 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106, Comment b (1942).
83 This is the approach of the Model Code. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
303 (1942), provides: "(1) The judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is outweighed by the risk
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time,
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing
the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly surprise a party
who has not had reasonable ground to anticipate that such evidence
would be offered. (2) All rules stating evidence to be admissible are
subject to this Rule unless the contrary is expressly stated."
84 Fronning contended that they should have been introduced. The impli-
cation of his argument was that the county attorney effectively sub-
stituted the prior statement for the evidence given at trial, thus
interfering with Fronning's right of cross-examination. Brief of Ap-
pellant at 19. Fronning wanted the entire statement admitted, or at
least produced in court. The state contended that it was always per-
missible to ask a witness whether he had made a prior inconsistent
statement, citing Welton v. State, 171 Neb. 643, 107 N.W.2d 394 (1961).
Brief of Appellee at 5-6. There was also an error charged concerning
a reference by the county attorney to a jail sentence served by one
of the state's witnesses, but the reference appears to have been brief
and neither side chose to make a central issue of it. Brief of Appellant,
at 18; Brief of Appellee at 8.
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be difficult for the court to limit the holding to its precise facts.
Indeed, such a notion is meaningless in this context since the facts
bear only a minimal relation to the holding.
85
Nor can the holding be limited to its general facts in the sense
that the rule may be said to apply only to criminal cases. While it
would have been possible to leave litigants in civil cases subject
to the traditional Nathan constraints, the court chose not to do so.
In Conn v. ITL, Inc.8 6 the court held that a plaintiff in a personal
injury action was not bound by the testimony of his witnesses
because Fronning had established that he did not vouch for their
credibility. While not actually dealing with an impeachment prob-
lem, Conn at least established that the Fronning reasoning and its
implications are equally applicable to both civil and criminal trial
situations. If the plaintiff no longer vouches for the credibility of
his witnesses, it seems logical to assume that he should be permitted
to impeach them, even in a civil action.
There is, of course, the possibility that the court will vitiate
the rule in subsequent case law by refusing to allow parties to
implement it. This could be done by narrowing the range of per-
missible impeachment weapons, restricting admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements or generally upsetting the parity that the
calling party now enjoys with his opponent. While all of the indica-
tions are against such action, it is available to the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the rule against impeaching one's own witness in
this jurisdiction has been one of judicial vacillation; while ap-
parently recognizing the need for reform, the court has repeatedly
felt constrained by the Nathan doctrine and its deep roots in com-
mon law. Although it is possible that the Fronning reform may be
substantially circumscribed, it is doubtful that the basic holding
will be altered. The court has recognized that there is no basis in
reason for a rule which prohibits the impeachment of one's own
witness, yet it has left itself sufficient room to deal with the abuses
which the new rule may present, and this seems a sensible result.
It has taken seventy-four years to lay Nathan to rest. Perhaps now
it will be permitted to rest in peace.
Jeffrey W. Meyers '73
85 On the other hand, the holding is hardly dictum simply by virtue of
this minimal relation. The case required a judgment concerning im-
peachment of one's own witness. If the language is considered a mere
dictum, then no such determination was made. See City of Lincoln v.
Steffensmeyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272 (1938).
86 187 Neb. 112, 187 N.W.2d 641 (1971).
